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Abstract: For psychologists, bounded rationality reflects the presence of cognitive dissonance 
and/or inconsistency, revealing that people use heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) rather 
than sophisticated processes for the assessment of their beliefs. Recent research analyzing 
litigations and pretrial negotiations also focused on boundedly rational litigants (Bar-Gill (2005), 
Farmer and Peccorino (2002)) relying on a naïve modelling of the self-serving bias. Our paper in 
contrast introduces the case for disappointment averse litigants, relying on the axiomatic of Gull 
(1991). We show that this leads to a richer analysis in comparative statics; at the same time, this 
proves to be … disappointing: for the purposes of public policies in favour of the access to justice, 
recommendations are quite ambiguous. 
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1. Introduction 
Two prominent theories have been suggested to explain how informational imperfections 
introduce biases in litigants' assessment of the outcome of trial, and to describe the failure of 
pretrial negotiations they imply. According to the "optimistic approach" (Priest and Klein (1984), 
Shavell (1982)), the plaintiff is more confident than the defendant about his own chances to win at 
trial - the more confident the plaintiff relative to the defendant, the more likely the trial. In the 
"strategic approach" (Bebchuk (1984)), the settlement amount proposed by one party may not be 
acceptable by the other given its unobservable type - thus disputes are sometimes solved in front 
of Courts (see Daughety (2000), Langlais and Chappe (2009) for a survey). 
More recently, Farmer and Pecorino (2002) and Bar-Gill (2002,2005) investigate a new 
line of research, assuming that litigants exhibit a form of bounded rationality that has been 
documented in the experimental literature (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)): the self-serving bias. 
Farber and Bazerman (1987) long ago argued that neither divergent expectations nor asymmetric 
information provide sufficient explanations for the existence of a disagreement in bargaining; in 
contrast, the existence of cognitive limits and bounded rationality, provide powerful arguments. A 
growing literature in the area of behavioral law and economics has also provided empirical and 
experimental evidence for the presence of anchoring effects and optimistic or self-serving bias on 
behalf of individuals in civil litigations. But cognitive biases are also exhibited by well experienced 
lawyers and judges (Ichino, Polo and Rettore (2003), Marinescu (2005), Rachlinski, Guthrie and 
Wistrich (2007), Viscusi (2001)) as well as more naive individuals (Babcock and Loewenstein 
(1997)).  
In this paper, we explore the consequences of the assumption that plaintiff’s preferences 
                                                 
1LEF-ENGEF-INRA-AgroParisTech, 14 rue Girardet, 54042 Nancy Cedex - France. 
 2 
under risk are characterized by disappointment aversion. Our basic intuition is that disappointment 
aversion in contrast to optimism should favour pretrial negotiations: given that plaintiffs could 
experience an unfavourable outcome at trial (if the Court sets the case for the defendant), they 
may be pushed towards accepting to settle amicably more frequently and in less favourable terms 
(settlement amounts). Grant, Kajii and Pollak define very generally disappointment aversion as 
follows (Grant, Kajii and Pollak, 2001, p 203): “When a lottery (or ‘act’) results in a relatively bad 
outcome, agents may experience disappointment at not having got a better outcome. This 
disappointment can worsen the disutility that the outcome produces directly. Similarly, relatively 
good outcomes can yield pleasurable feelings of ‘elation’ over and above the utility that the 
outcomes produce directly. A disappointment averse agent is one who dislikes disappointment 
more than she likes elation; this reduces the certainty equivalent value of lotteries or acts.”   
More specifically, we assume that the plaintiff displays disappointment aversion in the 
sense of Gul (1991): an outcome causes disappointment if it is worse than the certainty equivalent 
of the lottery. As a result, his preferences are characterized by the existence of an index (of 
disappointment aversion) denoted  0>β  , such that when he faces a risky prospect  
),;1,( 21 pxpxX −=  , with  ,21 xx <   his subjective expected gain is defined as2: 
 
AX = 1 + pβ1 + 1 − pβ 1 − px 1 + 1 −
1 − pβ
1 + 1 − pβ px 2
=
1 + β1 − p
1 + β − βp x 1 +
p
1 + β − βp x 2
 
Everything goes as if the plaintiff assesses a belief corresponding to his chances to win  2x , 
denoted as ( ) [1,0])( 1 ∈= −+ ppp ββσ ,  which is smaller than his true probability - and thus leading to a 
under assessment of the contribution of the largest outcome in the lottery to the total gain (utility); 
symmetrically, his belief corresponding to his chances to win a smaller gain 1x , denoted as 
)(1 pσ− , is larger than his true probability - and thus leading to an over assessment of the 
contribution of the smallest outcome in the lottery to the total gain (utility). As a result, the 
subjectively expected gain is smaller than the expected outcome of the lottery3: )()( XEXA < .  
Section 2 describes the complete model of pretrial negotiations, which is essentially an 
adaptation of Bebchuk (1984) where plaintiffs are no more risk neutral but averse to 
disappointment, and analyses its equilibrium. Section 3 focuses on the comparative statics. 
Section 4 enlarges the discussion and concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Assumptions and timing of the negotiations 
We consider a plaintiff which is hurt by an accident that may be the result of negligence or 
wrongdoings by another party, the defendant. The loss borne by the plaintiff in case of accident is  
0>D   and corresponds to the damages set by the Court in case where the trial is in favour of the 
victim. The compensation  D   is public information. Nevertheless,  p   the probability that the 
judgment at trial be in favour of the victim is private information; it is observable only to the plaintiff 
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( p   will be termed the type of the plaintiff). We assume that the defendant only knows that4  
],[ bap ∈   and is distributed according to a probability function characterized by the cumulative 
function  )( pG   and the density  )( pg  , which are public information.  In order to rule out 
secondary difficulties, we introduce the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 1: the inverse of the hazard rate  gG   is increasing. 
 
As explained in the introduction, we assume that the plaintiff displays disappointment 
aversion in the sense of Gul (1991), with an index (of disappointment aversion) denoted as 0>β , 
which is public information. Interestingly enough, it is straightforward that disappointment aversion 
in the sense of Gul implies loss aversion in the sense of Schmidt and Zank (2005). These authors 
suggest a definition of the behavioral concept of loss aversion which is more general than the one 
initially introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979): loss aversion holds in the sense of SZ if 
comparing two symmetric prospects  )½,;½,( xxX −=   and  )½,;½,( yyY −=   where  0≥> yx  , 
then the individual prefers  Y   to  X  . Given that we assume a linear utility for money, it is obvious 
that for any  0>β  , a disappointment averse plaintiff is also a loss averse one. 
Finally, we consider here that the defendant is a disappointment neutral individual. 
The negotiation game has two main stages, after that Nature has choosen the type of the 
plaintiff  p   in  ],[ ba  , and after that the plaintiff has sued his case: 
- In a first stage, the defendant makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer of settlement to the plaintiff, 
denoted  s  , in order to reach a amicable settlement of the case. 
- In the second stage, depending on his type, the plaintiff accepts the offer (thus, the case is 
settled) or rejects it, in which case parties go to trial. 
We introduce the American rule in order to describe the allocation of the costs borne by each 
parties at trial. We denote:  0>pC   the plaintiff's costs and  0>dC   the defendant's costs. 
Formally, the plaintiff's anticipated gain when he is of type  p   (thus he faces the prospect  
( )pCpCDX pp −−−= 1,;,  ) is written: 
pCDpXA −≡ )()( σ  
It is easy to verify (useful later on) that  0)( )1( )1( >= −− ppdpd p σσσ   such that  1)1( )1( <>−− orpp σσ  , and  
0)( 1 )1( <−= +−βσσβ σ pdd  . On the defendant side when he faces a plaintiff of type  p  , the risky trial is 
a prospect denoted  )1,;),(( pCpCDY dd −−+−=  , and the expected loss borne by the 
defendant is: dCpDYE +≡− )( . Finally we assume that  dp CCD +>   meaning that the case to 
be solved is socially worth. 
 
 
2.2 The separating equilibrium 
The equilibrium is described in terms of the amount for which the parties settle  s   (the 
equilibrium offer) and of the probability of a trial corresponding to the marginal plaintiff  )(sp  , the 
one who is indifferent between accepting the offer or rejecting it and going to trial. 
In the second stage, the plaintiff  p   chooses between a sure prospect: to accept the offer  s  , and 
a risky prospect: going to trial  X  , with an anticipated loss  pCDp −)(σ  . As a result, plaintiff  p   
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accepts the offer  s   soon as:  .)( dCDps −> σ   Otherwise, he rejects it. Let us denote as  )(sp   
the expectation of the marginal plaintiff by the defendant: 
 
sCDsp p =−))((σ        (1) 
 
Any plaintiff having a case weaker than the marginal type (any  )(spp ≤  ) also accepts the offer, 
while any plaintiff having a stronger case ( )(spp >  ) goes to trial. 
Coming back to the first stage, we are allowed to write the loss function according to which 
the defendant will set his best offer. With probability  ( ))(spG  , the defendant knows he will face a 
defendant prone to accept his settlement offer, and thus obtains an outcome  s   to settle the case. 
But with probability  ( ))(1 spG−  , the defendant knows he will face a case stronger than the 
marginal one, and thus will have to bear the risk of trial. Let us denote as  dpps
spG
pgb
sp ))((1
)(
)()( −∫=µ   
the mean type of the plaintiff conditional to the population having rejected the amicable offer and 
going to trial; thus the anticipated expenditure borne by the defendant at trial is  dCDs +)(µ  . The 
defendant will propose the best offer  0ˆ ≥s  , which minimizes the loss function: 
 
( ) 





+
−
×−+×= ∫ d
b
sp
Cdp
spG
pgpDspGsspGsL ))((1
)()))((1())((
)(
 
 
d
b
sp
CspGDdpppgsspG ×−+×



+×= ∫ )))((1()())(( )(
     (2) 
under condition (1). 
 
 
Proposition 1: In an interior equilibrium, the offer  sˆ   and the marginal defendant  pˆ   are set 
according to the following conditions: 
 
pCDps −= )ˆ(ˆ σ
     (3) 
 
)ˆ(1
ˆ1
)ˆ(
ˆ)ˆ(ˆ
ˆ| p
p
p
p
D
Cpp
g
G
p σσ
σ
−
−
××





+−=





     (4) 
 
where  dp CCC +≡   and  p
pp
ˆ1
ˆ)ˆ( ββσ −+=  , such that the probability of a trial is  )ˆ(1ˆ pG−=pi  . 
 
Proof: If  0ˆ >s   and [,]ˆ bap ∈   are an admissible interior solution for the minimization of (2), then 
the First Order Condition writes as: 
 
Gp̂ − gp̂ 1D
p̂
σp̂ ×
1 − p̂
1 − σp̂
p̂D − σp̂D + C = 0   #   
     (5) 
 
Rearranging the various terms leads to (4). In the appendix, we give a brief sketch of the 
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conditions under which (3)-(4) have a unique solution.  ■   
 
Two terms are worth to notice in the LHS term in (5). The first one is the marginal cost of 
the offer for the defendant since raising the offer leads to an increase in the settlement cost equal 
to the probability of settlement. The second LHS term in (5) is the marginal benefit of the offer 
which may be split in two components: 
- on the one hand, the effect of raising the offer on the probability of trial,  
( ) ( ) 0ˆ))((1( )ˆ(1 ˆ1)ˆ(ˆ1 <×−=− − − ppppDdsd pgspG σσ  ; this term reflects the efficiency of the screening of the 
various plaintiff's types due to an increase in the settlement amount; 
- on the other hand, the gains of the negotiation at the marginal defendant  
0))ˆ((ˆ >+− CDsDp µσ
 ; this one obviously reflects the gain associated to the screening of the 
plaintiffs according to their type. 
In Bebchuk's seminal model (if the informed party were the plaintiff, being neutral to 
disappointment) the equivalent to condition (4) is: 
 
D
C
g
G
p
=





ˆ|
 
 
As a result, the impact of disappointment aversion on the equilibrium is twofolds: on the one hand, 
it increases the gains of the negotiation since  ;0)ˆ(ˆ >− pp σ   on the other hand, it may either 
increase or decrease the efficiency of the separation between plaintiffs since  1)ˆ(1
ˆ1
)ˆ(
ˆ <>×
−
−
orp
p
p
p
σσ  . 
Hence, as compared to the case of Bebchuk (1984), the rate of trial may decrease or increase. We 
investigate more precisely these effects and their meaning in the comparative statics part of the 
paper. 
 
 
 
3. Comparative statics 
Results concerning the influence of fee shifting, costs and damages are identical to those 
obtained in Bebchuk and thus are not reproduced. We focus rather on the influence of 
disappointment aversion, and on the change in the range of the plaintiff's types. 
 
 
Proposition 2. An increase in  β  : 
- increases the type of the marginal plaintiff and thus decreases the rate of trial if  β
β
+
+≤ 2
1pˆ  ; 
otherwise, the effect is ambiguous. 
- has an ambiguous effect on the settlement offer; more specifically, if the marginal type decreases 
then the offer always decreases, although if the marginal plaintiff increases, the offer may 
decrease or increase. 
 
Proof. The sign of the effect of an increase in  β   on the marginal plaintiff is given by the sign of its 
impact on the RHS in (4) which writes: 
 








−
−
×





+





−
−






− )ˆ1(ˆ
)ˆ(211)ˆ(1
ˆ1
)ˆ(
ˆ)ˆ(
ˆ| pp
p
g
G
p
p
p
pp
d
d
p
σ
σσ
σβ
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The two first terms are positive (given that  0)ˆ( <pdd σβ  ). Thus it is straightforward to verify that a 
sufficient condition to obtain a positive effect is that (at the initial value of  pˆ  ):  
β
βσ +
+≤⇔≥− 2
1
ˆ0)ˆ(21 pp
 . 
The effect on the settlement offer  pCDps −= )ˆ(ˆ σ   depends on two effects: on the one hand, the 
direct effect of  β   on  )( pσ   which is always negative, and on the other the effect induced 
through the variation of  pˆ  , which may be positive or negative. Hence the result.  ■   
 
For their own, Farmer and Pecorino (2002) introduced the self-serving bias in Bebchuk’s 
model, and found that an increase in the optimistic bias of the plaintiff increases the frequency of 
trial and decreases the settlement amount. Thus, it is quite surprising to find that disappointment 
has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium. In order to understand the result, we may investigate 
what occurs in a case where the parties have not the opportunity to have a pretrial negotiation. In 
this case, the participation constraint of the plaintiff shows that all types  p   for which  
0)( ≥− pCDpσ   will go to trial, meaning that only the cases stronger than  D
C p
D
pCp ×=
+
+
β
β
1
1
0   will 
go to trial (chooses the conflict). The weakest ( 0pp <  ) are sorted out. Hence, the probability of 
trial is equal to  )(1 0pG−   which is (non ambiguously) decreasing in  β   (given that  0p   
increases with  β  ). This means that without any opportunity to solve their case, plaintiffs sensible 
to disappointment aversion will be prone to temperate their willingness to obtain a compensation 
for the injury they have suffer from, the larger their disappointment aversion the smaller the rate of 
litigation. 
 
 The next propositions introduce two different modifications in the population of plaintiffs. 
We first develop the analytics in two separate propositions, and, second, jointly comment the 
results. 
 
 
Proposition 3: An additive shift to the right in the range of plaintiff's type: 
- gives a less than proportional increase in the type of the marginal plaintiff if  β
β 111ˆ −+−≥p  ; 
otherwise, it may lead to a more than proportional increase in the marginal plaintiff; 
- increases the probability of trial if  β
β 111ˆ −+−≥p  ; otherwise, the effect is ambiguous. 
- increases the equilibrium offer. 
 
Proof. We define (see also Bebchuk (1984)) an additive shift to the right of the range of plaintiff's 
types as a  t  -translation of plaintiff's types, such that  p   is now distributed in the interval  
],[ tbta ++   (with  0≥t  ) with the cumulative  )( pΓ   and the density  )( pγ   satisfying the 
following correspondences with the primitives  )( pG   and  )( pg  : 
Γp = Gp − t
γp = gp − t
 
In fact, these two conditions characterize a family of distribution functions which is parametrized 
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by  0≥t  , where  0=t   gives us the primitives, and  0>t   leads to a distribution with a higher 
mean type but having identical higher order moments. In this case, the condition (4) may be 
substituted with the general formulation: 
 
G
g |p̂−t
= p̂ − σp̂ + CD ×
p̂
σp̂
×
1 − p̂
1 − σp̂
  #   
    (6) 
 
with  )ˆ(1ˆ tpG −−=pi   and  sˆ   given by (3). Differentiating (6) gives: 
 
dp̂
dt =
1
Δ
G
g |p̂−t
′
 
 
with:  ( ) ( ) 012 )ˆ(1 ˆ1)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ1(ˆ ))ˆ(ˆ
ˆ|ˆ| >×−+×+≡∆ −
−
−
−
′
p
p
p
p
pp
pp
pg
G
pg
G
σσ
σ
  according to the second order condition. 
Thus, it is obvious that  0ˆ >dt
pd
  since under assumption 1 the numerator is also positive:  
( ) 0)ˆ|( >′ −tpgG  . Then it is sufficient to have  ββσσ 11))ˆ(1)(ˆ( )ˆ1(ˆ 1ˆ01 −+−− −≥⇔>− ppp pp   in order to also obtain 
that  1ˆ <dt
pd
 ; otherwise, 1ˆ <> ordt
pd
 . As a result  )ˆ(1ˆ tpG −−=pi   increases with  t   if  
.1ˆ 11 β
β −+
−≥p
  Otherwise, the effect is ambiguous. Finally, given that the marginal type increases 
with  t  , it is also straightforward to see that the equilibrium offer  sˆ   also increases with  t  .  ■   
 
In the last proposition, we denote as: )( pE=µ   the mean type of the plaintiff. 
 
 
Proposition 4. A mean-preserving proportional shift in the range of plaintiff's type: 
- decreases the marginal type if  µ<pˆ  ; otherwise, the effect is ambiguous; 
- has an ambiguous effect on the probability of trial; 
- decreases (increases) the equilibrium offer if the marginal type decreases (respectively, 
increases). 
 
Proof. We define (see also Bebchuk (1984)) a mean-preserving proportional shift in the range of 
plaintiff's types as the composition of an additive shift to the left (a  )1( t−µ  -translation, with  1≥t   
and  )( pE=µ  ) plus a multiplicative shift of plaintiff's types, such that  p   is now distributed in the 
interval  ta + μ1 − t, tb + μ1 − t   with a cumulative probability function  Γp   and a density  
)( pγ   satisfying the following correspondences with the primitives  )( pG   and  )( pg  : 
 
Γp = G p − μt + μ
γp = 1t g
p − μ
t + μ
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Once more, these two conditions characterize a family of distribution functions which is 
parametrized by  1≥t  , where  1=t   gives us the primitives, and  1>t   gives us a new 
distribution with the same mean  )( pE=µ   but which is more spread than the primitive 
distribution; thus it has moments of higher orders which are larger than those of the primitive. In 
this case, the condition (4) may be now substituted with the general formulation: 
 
t × Gg | p−μt +μ
= p̂ − σp̂ + CD ×
p̂
σp̂
×
1 − p̂
1 − σp̂   #   
 
 
with  ( )µpi µ +−= −tpG ˆ1ˆ  . I) Differentiating (7) gives: 
 
dp̂
dt =
1
Δ
× Gg | p̂−μt +μ
′
×
p̂ − μ
t −
G
g | p̂−μt +μ
 
 
It is obvious that  0ˆ ˆ <⇒< dt
pdp µ   although if  µ>pˆ   then  dtpd
ˆ
  has an ambiguous sign. II) 
Similarly,  pi   may decrease or increase with  t   since: 
 
dπ̂
dt = −g
p̂ − μ
t + μ ×
1
t ×
dp̂
dt −
p̂ − μ
t
 
 
Hence the result. III) Given the ambiguity on the marginal type, it is also straightforward to see that 
the equilibrium offer  sˆ   may as well increase (if the marginal type increases) as decrease 
(respectively if the marginal type decreases) with  t  .  ■   
 
 Note that in the seminal paper by Bebchuk (1984) – i.e. for disappointment neutral plaintiffs, 
the additive shift in the range of types considered in proposition 3, leads to an increase in the 
settlement amount (because it increase the expected value to the plaintiff of a trial) but has no 
effect on the likelihood of a settlement (because it will not change the difference in these levels 
between any two given types); on the other hand, the multiplicative shift of proposition 4 has an 
ambiguous effect on the settlement amount but increases the likelihood of a trial (because it will 
increase the difference in expected outcome of a trial between any two given types). By contrast, 
when considering disappointment averse plaintiffs and alternative shifts in their characteristics, we 
obtain more ambiguous results. To sum up, as shown through the various qualitative results, it 
seems that the impacts of additive/uniform shifts are not easily predictable, and to the least, not 
more easily than those of proportional shifts. Moreover, our formal results in proposition 3 and 4 
exhibit a kind of “dependency with respect to the initial equilibrium”, as reflected by the restrictions 
required on the initial value of the marginal type pˆ . 
It is not straightforward to find out specific conclusions, as for practical purposes, in terms 
of policy recommendations. However, our results suggest that the issue with access to services of 
justice, and the design of public policies, are of major importance, although more tricky, as soon as 
litigants are not disappointment averse. 
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4. Conclusion  
There is a long standing debate in experimental economics concerning the relevant 
interpretation of the growing evidence that people proceed with probabilities transformation or 
manipulation in a way not consistent with rational inference and Bayesian updating rules. For 
psychologists, his reflects a kind of bounded rationality due to the presence of cognitive 
dissonance or inconsistency, revealing that people use heuristics rather than sophisticated 
processes for the assessment of their beliefs. Recent research in Law & Economics also focus on 
the case with boundedly rational litigants. This paper introduces disappointment aversion as a 
channel for probability manipulation which at the intuitive level is the opposite perspective of 
Bar-Gill (2005) or Farmer and Pecorino (2002), who both relied on the self-serving bias. But 
disappointment aversion is captured here in a way consistent with rational behaviour – at least in 
the sense of a falsifiable theory based on a complete axiomatic (Gull (1991)). Note that to the 
extent that disappointment aversion induces also loss aversion (well documented), our paper 
provides results regarding also the influence of loss aversion in a judicial context. Thus our results 
add to the literature in several respects. 
 In our framework, disappointment aversion has consequences that contrast with those of 
the self-serving bias in Bar-Gill (2005) or Farmer and Pecorino (2002), since we obtain a larger 
pattern of predicted behaviours. In particular, although the self-serving bias is supposed to induce 
common place effects in naïve models, the index of disappointment averse seems to have more 
various implications here. As a result, shifts in the plaintiff’s characteristics are also described as 
having more contrasted impacts. This suggests at least two different conclusions. First, modelling 
more closely what we call bounded rationality may be of great importance. Second, the 
empirical/experimental calibration the disappointment index is an important avenue of future 
research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
SECOND ORDER CONDITION. Remark that under assumption 1, the LHS in (4) is an increasing 
function of  p  . However under assumption 2, the RHS is not (necessarily) a monotonically 
decreasing function of  p  : thus, there may exist several extrema (several values of  p   satisfying 
(4) with their associated offer satisfying (2)). When this is the case, inspection of the second order 
condition which requires that the marginal cost of the offer increases more than its marginal 
benefit (or:  0)( ≥′′ sL  ) enables us to indentiy which ones of those extrema are local minima. This 
requirement is satified soon as: 
 
0)ˆ(1
ˆ1
)ˆ(
ˆ
1)ˆ1(ˆ
))ˆ(ˆ2
ˆ|ˆ|
>





−
−
×−+
−
−
×





+





′
p
p
p
p
pp
pp
g
G
g
G
pp σσ
σ
 
 
at any admissible extremum  pˆ  . A sufficient condition is that  01 ))ˆ(1)(ˆ(
)ˆ1(ˆ >−
−
−
pp
pp
σσ   implying that the 
index of disappointment aversion must be small enough or equivalently set:  β
β 111ˆ −+−≥p  . 
In FIGURE 1 ( )( pH   stands for the RHS in (4)), there exist three extrema, but the smallest 
and the largest values only are two local minima while the intermediate one is a local maximum  
Finally, substituting each value of the admissible minimum in  )(sL   provides us with the global 
 11 
minimum, which is the way we implicitly proceed in proposition 1. 
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